Law and financial markets: the role of financial stability board to design a legal framework for the governance of the global financial system
| Autor | Caio Enrique Yoshikawa |
| Páginas | 127-137 |
127
ESPAÇO DISCENTE
LAW AND FINANCIAL MARKETS:
THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD
TO DESIGN A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR THE GOVERNANCE
OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM1
C H Y
1. Introduction. 2. Law as the designer of the Markets. 3. The Role of Financial
Stability Board. 4. From FSF to FSB: towards a new paradigm of global go-
vernance. 5. Convergence in Divergence: the functional contradiction of FSB.
6. Conclusion. Bibliography.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this work is to deve-
lop the theoretical analysis about the law
as m echanism of design of markets upon
a case study on the international fi nancial
regulation, focusing the role of the Financial
Stability Board (FSB). In view of such analy-
sis, I will develop two di erent arguments,
one related to its structure and another to its
function. Firstly, the institutional design of
FSB refl ects the changes in balance of po-
wers and consequently the global governance
verifi ed in the last decade. The second one
is that the e ectiveness of FSB’s activities is
challenged by the tension between its mis-
sion towards convergence of legal rules on
fi nancial regulation and supervision among
several jurisdictions and, on the other side,
the recognition of legal di erences across the
jurisdictions due their specifi c circumstances.
This work departs from the basic as-
sumption that the law is an essential tool
for shaping and provision of stability of
markets in a capitalist economic system.
Such approach is shared by the most diverse
academic movements throughout the ideolo-
gical spectrum, from the Law and Economics
movement to more developmental (inter-
ventionist) traditions. The regulation of the
fi nancial system is therefore presented as a
powerful example of the correctness of this
assumption.
The expansion of the global markets
and the internationalization of financial
markets and the consequent systemic risks
created a worldwide space that needs conver-
gence towards macro prudential rules upon
1. I am grateful to my friends Pedro Schilling and
Spencer Cooney for early discussions and language re-
view, respectively. All errors are my sole responsibility.
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