A tutela de evidência em matéria tributária

AutorGabriela Bittencourt
Páginas235-246
A TUTELA DE EVIDÊNCIA EM MATÉRIA TRIBUTÁRIA
EVIDENCE TUTELAGE IN TAX LAW
GABRIELA BITTENCOURT
1
RESUMO: O estudo em questão analisa o instituto da tutela de evidência, abordando seus aspectos
gerais, e, sobretudo, sua aplicação no direito tributário. Pretende-se examinar inicialmente aspectos
gerais do instituto da tutela de evidência, inserido no novo código de Processo Civil Brasileiro. Trata-
se de uma análise essencial em primeiro plano, para que se possa, posteriormente, desenvolver o tema
no cenário do direito tributário, tarefa que consiste no objetivo principal deste artigo. A tutela de
evidência – que não se confunde com a tutela de urgência – consiste em técnica processual
diferenciada de antecipação dos efeitos da tutela definitiva do mérito, independentemente da
comprovação do dano irreparável ou de difícil reparação.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Tutela de evidência. Novo Código de Processo Civil. Direito tributário.
ABSTRACT: The article analyzes the tutelage and guardianship of the evidence institute, including
the general aspects and mainly its application in tax law. It is intended to initially examine general
aspects of the Institute for the Protection of evidence, inserted in the new Brazilian Civil procedure
code. It is an essential analysis in the foreground, so that it can subsequently develop the theme in the
scenario of tax law, the task which consists of the main objective of this article. The Guardianship of
evidence – which is not confused with the tutelage of urgency – consists of the differentiated
procedural technique of anticipating the effects of the definitive protection of merit, regardless of the
proof of irreparable damage or difficult repair.
KEYWORDS: Tutelage and guardianship of the evidence. New Code of Civil Procedure. Tax Law.
Advogada. Mestre em Direito pela UFSC. Especialista em Direito Tributário PUC-SP. Especialista em Direito
1
Tributário IBET.
Revista Acadêmica da Faculdade de Direito do Recife, vol.90, n.01, jan.-jun. 2018
235
4
Volume 89, número 01, jan-jun. 2017
Why Individual Freedom and the Autonomy of Law
Stand or Fall Together
Bjarne Melkevik1
Åsbjørn Melkevik2
1 Two Kinds of Autonomy – Legal and Individual
There is, in legal philosophy, an ongoing debate about the autonomy of law, that
is, about the extent to which law is distinguishable from some other phenomena. The
dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role. Justice
and efficacy, then, are probably the most common relational others to law. For example,
it is common to say that the law should further a certain understanding of distributive
justice – this is the view preferred by philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin. Others have argued for the efficacy of the law as with the law-and-economics
approach most famously championed by Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner.
This paper argues for a radically different understanding of the law, as it explains why
the law should indeed be autonomous. The question, however, is not whether the law is
actually autonomous or not – it is obviously not, as the law is too often the plaything of
various lawgivers. The real question is the following – do we want to be autonomous, as
individuals? The answer is obviously yes, individual freedom being a universal value,
and therefore, this paper argues, the law should also be autonomous. There is, as we will
1 Doctorat d’État in Legal Science at University Paris 2 – France. Professor at the Faculté de Droit –
Université Laval /Canada.
2 Ph.D. in political studies, Queen`s University. Post-Doctoral Fellow-in-Residence at Harvard University.
Autores convidados
Recebimento em 27/06/2017
Aceito em 07/07/2017
Recebido em 30/11/2017
Aprovado em 19/02/2018
4
Volume 89, número 01, jan-jun. 2017
Why Individual Freedom and the Autonomy of Law
Stand or Fall Together
Bjarne Melkevik1
Åsbjørn Melkevik2
1 Two Kinds of Autonomy – Legal and Individual
There is, in legal philosophy, an ongoing debate about the autonomy of law, that
is, about the extent to which law is distinguishable from some other phenomena. The
dominant views, today, all understand law as fulfilling a certain instrumental role. Justice
and efficacy, then, are probably the most common relational others to law. For example,
it is common to say that the law should further a certain understanding of distributive
justice – this is the view preferred by philosophers such as John Rawls and Ronald
Dworkin. Others have argued for the efficacy of the law as with the law-and-economics
approach most famously championed by Judges Frank Easterbrook and Richard Posner.
This paper argues for a radically different understanding of the law, as it explains why
the law should indeed be autonomous. The question, however, is not whether the law is
actually autonomous or not – it is obviously not, as the law is too often the plaything of
various lawgivers. The real question is the following – do we want to be autonomous, as
individuals? The answer is obviously yes, individual freedom being a universal value,
and therefore, this paper argues, the law should also be autonomous. There is, as we will
1 Doctorat d’État in Legal Science at University Paris 2 – France. Professor at the Faculté de Droit –
Université Laval /Canada.
2 Ph.D. in political studies, Queen`s University. Post-Doctoral Fellow-in-Residence at Harvard University.
Autores convidados
Recebimento em 27/06/2017
Aceito em 07/07/2017

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