The law of words: standing, environment, and other contested terms
| Autor | David Nathan Cassuto |
| Páginas | 330-383 |
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Novos Estudos Jurídicos
THE LAW OF WORDS: STANDING,
ENVIRONMENT, AND OTHER
CONTESTED TERMS
A LEI DAS PALAVRAS: PERMANÊNCIA, MEIO AMBIENTE E
OUTROS TERMOS CONTESTADOS
LA LEY DE LAS PALABRAS: PERMANENCIA, MEDIO AMBIENTE Y
OTROS TÉRMINOS CONSTESTADOS
David N. Cassuto1
1 Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., University of
California at Berkeley, Bosh Hall School of Law; Ph.D., Indiana University. I would like to thank William Fletcher,
Ben Geraliman, Don Doemberg, John Nolon, Ann Powers, Jeffrey Miller, Jerrob Duffy, Arthur Haubenstock, and We
and Tobby Cassuto for their insights, comments, and help with this Article, and Brian Brittingham for his research
assistance. A very special thanks to Elizabeth Downes, my partner in everything, who made this piece possible.
Abstract: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), exposes fundamental incoherencies within
environmental standing doctrine, even while it ostensibly makes standing
easier to prove for plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits. According to
Laidlaw, an environmental plaintiff needs only to show personal injury
to satisfy Article ill’s standing requirement; she need not show that the
alleged statutory violation actually harms the environment. This Article
argues that Laidlaw’s distinbtion between injury to the plaintiff and harm
to the environment is nonsensical. Both the majority and dissent in Laidlaw
incorrectly assume that there exists an objective standard by which a
plaintiff, society or a court can measure harm or injury. Using examples
(Barbara Klngsolver’s novel Animal Dreams), this Article illustrates that the
or injury without acknowledging the systemic perspective from which the
concepts are viewed. The path to an intelligible standing doctrine lies not in
violations as injurious to the social and legal system of which we all form
a part. Assuming the violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the
resulting harm to the system could and should enable individuals to sue. This
policy would conform the Court’s standing jurisprudence to the language
and intent of the statutes before Ii. Moreover, this policy would counter the
undermining of the rhetoric of environmental protection that persists so
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Resumo: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000) expõe incoerências fundamentais dentro da doutrina ambiental permanente,
mesmo que aparentemente tornando provar mais fácil para os demandantes em processos
ambientais. De acordo com Laidlaw, um demandante ambiental precisa apenas mostrar
danos pessoais para satisfazer a exigência permanente do Artigo III; a parte não precisa
mostrar que a alegada violação estatutária realmente prejudica o meio ambiente. Este
artigo argumenta que a distinção de Laidlaw entre o dano ao demandante e o dano
ao meio ambiente é absurda. Tanto a maioria como a divergência na Laidlaw supõem
incorretamente que existe um objetivo padrão pelo qual um autor, sociedade ou tribunal
pode medir danos ou ferimentos. Usando tanto exemplos extraídos da história (The Trail
lesão sem reconhecer a perspectiva sistêmica em que os conceitos são vistos. O caminho
mas sim em reconhecer as violações estatutárias como prejudiciais ao sistema social e legal
do qual todos nós fazemos parte. Considerando que o estatuto violado contenha uma
provisão para um processo civil, o dano resultante ao sistema poderia e deveria permitir
que indivíduos processassem. Tal política conformaria a jurisprudência permanente da
Corte à linguagem e intenção dos estatutos anteriores. Além disso, essa política contrariaria
o enfraquecimento da retórica de proteção ambiental que persistirá enquanto a Suprema
Corte continuar com seus frequentes, porém malsucedidos, esforços para refazer sua
Resumen: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167
(2000) expone incoherencias fundamentales dentro de la doctrina ambiental permanente,
aunque aparentemente haciéndolo más fácil para los demandantes en procesos
ambientales. De acuerdo con Laidlaw, un demandante ambiental necesita solamente
mostrar daños personales para satisfacer la exigencia permanente del Artículo III; la parte
no necesita mostrar que la supuesta violación estatutaria realmente perjudica al medio
ambiente. Este artículo argumenta que la distinción de Laidlaw entre el daño al demandante
y el daño al medio ambiente es absurda. Tanto la mayoría como la divergencia en el Laidlaw
suponen incorrectamente que existe un objetivo padrón por el cual un autor, sociedad o
tribunal puede medir daños o lesiones. Usando tanto ejemplos extraídos de la historia (The
o lesión sin reconocer la perspectiva sistémica en que los conceptos son vistos. El camino
pero si en reconocer las violaciones estatutarias como perjudiciales al sistema social y legal
del cual todos nosotros formamos parte. Considerando que el estatuto violado contenga
una provisión para un proceso civil, el daño resultante al sistema podría y debería permitir
que individuos procesen. Tal política conformaría la jurisprudencia permanente de la Corte
al lenguaje e intención de los estatutos anteriores. Además, esta política contrariaría el
debilitamiento de la retórica de protección ambiental que persistirá mientras la Suprema
Corte continúe con sus frecuentes, sim embargo fracasados, esfuerzos para rehacer su
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about one sentence. The sentence, found in the majority of
opinions of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc.2, reads as follows:
The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing is not injury to the
environment but injury to the plaintiff.3
Both alone and in the context of the full opinion, this sentence exposes
fundamental incoherencies within standing doctrine, especially with respect to
the relationship between standing and environmental law. This Article argues
that the opposition the sentence creates - injury to the plaintiff versus harm
to the environment - is both nonsensical and entirely ancillary to the language
and purpose of the statute Laidlaw supposedly interprets. Claiming that injury
to the plaintiff rather than harm to the environment comprises the requisite for
standing enables the Court to ground its basis for standing in an opposition that
4 In other words,
the sentence (and, consequently, the rest of the opinion) is simultaneously legally
strong and rhetorically incoherent.
The path to an intelligible standing doctrine does not lie in such fruitless
comparisons. Rather, it lies in acknowledging statutory violations as injurious
to the social and legal system of which we all form a part.5 Assuming that the
violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the resulting harm to the system
could and should enable individuals to sue. This policy would relieve the Supreme
It would also conform the Court’s standing jurisprudence to the language and
intent of the statutes before it. Under the current regime, the statutory language
often factors very little in the Court’s analysis.
Even though its holding enhances citizen suit standing, Laidlaw, nevertheless
2 528 U.S. 167 (2000) [hereinafter Laidlaw IV]. Since the Article discusses two district court opinions, a Fourth Circuit
appeal, and a Supreme Court case with the same case name, the Article will employ a numbering system for all of
the Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., decisions: 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C.
1995) [hereinafter Laidlaw I], 956 F. Supp. 588 (D.S.C. 1997) [hereinafter Laidlaw II], 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998)
[hereinafter Laidlaw III].
3 Id. at 181.
4 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Siena Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
5 See infra Part IV.A
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