O efeito do tamanho na relação entre estrutura de controle e disclosure voluntário de companhias brasileiras
| Autor | Vagner Naysinger Machado, Igor Bernardi Sonza |
| Cargo | Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM). email: vagnernaysinger@gmail.com - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM). email: igorsonza@gmail.com |
| Páginas | 21-38 |
O Efeito do Tamanho na Relação entre Estrutura de Controle e Disclosure Voluntário de Companhias Brasileiras
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RESUMO
O estudo objetiva analisar a inuência do tamanho na relação
entre estrutura de controle e disclosure voluntário das compa-
nhias listas na B3. Para atingir este m, foi criada uma variável
dependente, “nível de disclosure voluntário”, que corresponde
a 38 indicadores de informações coletados manualmente dos
demonstrativos e sites das empresas. Após, estimou-se um mo-
delo de regressão com dados em painel balanceados através
do efeito threshold para tamanho, a m de identicar a relação
entre as variáveis. Os resultados indicaram que as empresas
menores, com estrutura de controle mais concentrada, tendem
a apresentar maior nível de disclosure voluntário. Contudo, para
as maiores empresas, quanto maior a concentração da estrutu-
ra de controle, menor a evidenciação dessas informações. Essas
inferências levam a crer que as maiores corporações brasileiras
com controle mais concentrado podem não estar interessadas
em divulgar informações voluntárias, porque a maioria de seus
acionistas goza de benefícios privados de controle.
Palavras-Chave: Estrutura de controle; Assimetria Informa-
cional; Disclosure voluntário
ABSTRACT
This study aims to analyze the inuence of size on the re-
lationship between the control structure on the voluntary
disclosure policy of the listed companies in B3. To achieve
this goal, we created a dependent variable, called “voluntary
disclosure level”, which corresponds to 38 indicators of infor-
mation collected manually from the companies’ statements
and websites. Afterwards, we estimated a balanced panel
data regression model with a threshold eect for size in order
to identify the relationship between the variables. The results
indicated that smaller companies, with a more concentrated
control structure, tended to present a higher level of voluntary
disclosure. However, for larger companies, the greater the
concentration of the control structure, the less evidence of this
information. These inferences lead to believe that the largest
Brazilian corporations, with more concentrated control, may
not be interested in disclosing voluntary information because
most of their shareholders enjoy private control benets.
Key-words: Control structure; Informational Asymmetry;
Voluntary Disclosure
O EFEITO DO TAMANHO NA RELAÇÃO ENTRE
ESTRUTURA DE CONTROLE E DISCLOSURE
VOLUNTÁRIO DE COMPANHIAS BRASILEIRAS
Do Largest Corporations Disclosure Less Information
Because They Have More Private Benefits?
Vagner Naysinger Machado
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM).
email: vagnernaysinger@gmail.com
Igor Bernardi Sonza
Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM).
email: igorsonza@gmail.com
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-8077.2019.e60582
Submetido: 06/12/2018
Aceito: 20/08/2020
Vagner Naysinger Machado • Igor Bernardi Sonza
22
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Revista de Ciências da Administração • v. 21, n. 55, p. 21-38, Outubro. 2019
1 INTRODUÇÃO
e disclosure of information is a determining
factor for an ecient allocation of resources and,
consequently, growth of the economy (Bushman et
al., 2004). Both the quantity and the quality of the
information evidenced to the external users would
provide credibility to the managers of the companies
in the capital market (Baums, 2002). However, it is
assumed that the information available may be im-
perfect, its production and disclosure has a certain
cost, and there is a level of information asymmetry
that aects the conduct of companies and individuals
(Stiglitz, 2000). is can generate agency conicts
between the owners and managers of the capital.
is asymmetric information can be manifested
in any contractual relationship, where each user’s
level of information is dierent (Akerlof, 1970; Sti-
glitz, 2000), or when not all facts are known to both
parties to the contract (Hendriksen & Van Bredda,
1999). is fact can generate inecient valuation of
stocks, high capital cost, excessive private benets
for those with privileged access to information (Lev,
2005), as well as a possible reduction in the liquidity of
organizations’ stocks (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991).
e occurrence of agency conicts, fostered by
informational asymmetry, may be related to the way
capital is formed. In this sense, the main dierentia-
tion is the control structure of the companies related
to the level of stock concentration. e structure can
be more concentrated, with few stockholders holding
large numbers of shares, or more dispersed, with
several stockholders with few shares (Stiglitz, 2000).
For Jensen and Meckling (1976), the concentra-
tion of shareholder control in the “hands” of a single
shareholder can be benecial as it would increase
the company’s monitoring capacity at a lower cost.
On the other hand, a concentrated control structure
can encourage controllers to seek private benets
(Consoni et al., 2017). In addition, it may lead to a
conict of interests between majority and minority
shareholders, allowing the expropriation of the mi-
nority shareholders, which may generate inecient
investments. In other words, a highly concentrated
structure may not be optimal for shareholders (La
Porta, et al., 1999).
One measure used to minimize this problem
of informational asymmetry and agency conicts
would be the disclosure of the information, which
can be understood as a channel of disclosure of the
company’s information to the market (Botosan, 1997),
thus acting as a facilitator of the decision-making
process (Baums, 2002). However, the willingness of
company managers to disclose information may be
inuenced by the structural form of the capital.
Studies like Chau and Gray (2002), Ajinkya et
al. (2005), Gisbert and Navallas (2013), Haddad et al.
(2015), Nagata and Nguyen (2017), Allaya et al. (2018)
and karajeh (2020) suggest that a more concentrated
control structure would increase the willingness of
managers to evidence voluntary information. is is
supported by the argument of Jensen and Meckling
(1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that the con-
centration of control would provide economic incen-
tives for eective monitoring, which more dispersed
structures do not have.
On the other hand, Kolsi (2017) argue that
controllers would have access to private information,
and prefer to maintain this informational advantage,
discouraging voluntary disclosure. For Jankens-
gärd (2018) there is an optimum point between the
control structure and the disclosure of information,
which the disclosure of information increases with
the concentration of control to a certain point, and
tends to fall, reecting the eects of agency conicts
between majority and minority shareholders. Winter
and Zülch (2019) found no signicant relationship
between control structure and information disclosure
policy of German companies.
In Brazil, there are few studies investigating the
inuence of the control structure on the information
disclosure policy (Almeida et al. 2015). For instance,
Viana Junior and Crisóstomo (2019) suggest that
the shareholding concentration positively inuences
the disclosure of information, in which controlling
shareholders, concerned with the reputation and le-
gitimacy of the companies’ behavior, would be willing
to promote better voluntary disclosure policies. On
the other hand, for Almeida et al. (2015), the control
structure does not seem to impact the voluntary dis-
closure of Brazilian companies.
In addition, there are studies that investigate
the explanatory factors of disclosure in the Brazilian
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