Economia como Matching
| Autor | Philippe Steiner |
| Cargo | Sorbonne Université |
| Páginas | 14-45 |
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2175-7984.2019v18n43p14
1414 – 45
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Economy as Matching
Philippe Steiner1
Abstract
Recently, a new denition of the economy appeared in which matching is central stage. Matching
means that there exist some specic issues related to the effective association of a given resource
with a given person. Matching may thus appear an extension of the traditional issue related to
the distribution of wealth; against this appearance, the present communication emphasizes that
something else is at stake when it comes to understanding how matching is actually implemented.
The rst part of the communication is devoted to explaining what is meant by matching in
the present state of the economy, with a special emphasis on the works of Alvin Roth. The
second part is about the sociological underpinnings of the matching approach to economic issues,
showing how different it is from the market. Finally, the third part connects economy as matching
to Michel Foucault’s understanding of pastorate, focusing on the changes brought about by the
huge amount of data and the technology necessary to implement a new form of governmentality,
that in which, according to the old religious precept, the leader must govern the population as a
whole and each individual in particular (“omnes et singulatim” in Foucault’s terms).
Keywords: matching, algorithm; economic sociology
1 Introduction
Since the second half of the 18th century a plurality of denition of
the subject matter of political economy, and then economics, have been
designed by leading economists. ese denitions range from material ones,
when the science is about wealth, understood as the set of resources that
are both useful and dicult to produce (from Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot
to Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill), to formal ones,
when it is all about the rational use of scarce and useful goods that may be
useful in dierent settings (from Lionel Robbins to Paul Samuelson).
1 Sorbonne Université.
Política & Sociedade - Florianópolis - Vol. 18 - Nº 43 - Set./Dez. de 2019
1514 – 45
Beyond that diversity, there exist some commonalities stemming
from the fact that economists are, most often, endeavoring to set the laws
regulating the production, distribution and exchange – sometimes the
consumption – of wealth or of these scarce and useful goods susceptible
of alternative uses. is common threat applies in the case of the micro
approach to political economy, from Adam Smith’s famous chapter 7 on
the functioning of a market in the Wealth of the Nations, to Gary Becker’s
and Jean Tirole’s extended economic approach to human behavior; it
applies as well at the macro level, from François Quesnay’s Economic Table
to omas Piketty’s Le capital au 21e siècle.
Recently, a new denition of the economy appeared in which
matching is central stage. Matching means that there exist some specic
issues related to the eective association of a given resource with a given
person. Matching may thus appear an extension of the traditional issue
related to the distribution of wealth; against this appearance, the present
communication emphasizes that something else is at stake when it comes
to understanding how matching is actually implemented.
e rst part of the communication is devoted to explaining what
is meant by matching in the present state of the economy, with a special
emphasis on the works of Alvin Roth, an economist who received in 2012
the Prize of the Bank of Sweden in honor of Alfred Nobel for his work on
matching markets. e second part is about the sociological underpinnings
of the matching approach to economic issues, showing how dierent it is
from the market. Finally, the third part connects economy as matching
to Michel Foucault’s understanding of pastorate, focusing on the changes
brought about by the huge amount of data and the technology necessary
to implement a new form of governmentality, the one in which the old
religious precept requiring the leader to govern the population as a whole
and each individual in particular (“omnes et singulatim” in Foucault’s
terms) becomes eective.
2 Economics as matching
Matching is a further development of political economy since it is
fundamentally dealing with the issue of the distribution side that pertains
Economy as Matching | Philippe Steiner
16 14 – 45
to that science since the beginning – the most famous piece of political
economy written by Turgot was published in 1766 as Reections on the
formation and the distribution of Wealth(TURGOT, [1766], 1914). More
precisely, we may connect the issue of matching with markets, the central
institution of modern economy, as it is clear with Smith’s chapter on the
market, even if this is generally blurred by the importance given to the
gravitation of market prices around natural ones. However, if one looks
at the process thanks to which this gravitation occurs, then the matching
issue appears strongly connected to competitive relations on the market:
A competition will immediately begin among them buyers confronted to a shortage of
goods, and the market price will rise more or less above the natur al price, according to either
the greatness of the deciency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors, happen
to animate more or less eagerness of the competition. (SMITH, [1776] 1981, I, p. 73-74).
2.1 Matching: market and arena2
e competitive allocation process driven by the setting of an
equilibrium price is a satisfying proxy for the matching issue as long as
some structural conditions in the functioning of the market are left out3.
Beyond this general connection, matching involves something more than
the formation of a price (or a shadow price) that clears the market or even
more than the formation of pairs maximizing output (BECKER, [1973]
1978). Structural elements involve issues about preferences, quality, and
information (STOVEL; FOUNTAIN, 2009; COLEMAN, 1984).
Matching is about the precise allocation of a resource –be it a person,
a service or a material good – to a specic person under the constraint of
2 Throughout this communication, I use arena in the sense suggested by Harrison White (1992, p. 30-32). On
an arena, “actors are there to make matching” (WHITE, 1992, p. 52) in a one shot process designed to “select”
and “purify”.
3 See for example, Alfred Marshall’s chapter “On Market” when he explained that general markets require a uni-
versal demand and things that can be easily and e xactly described: “Thus for instance cotton, wheat, and iron
satisfy wants that are urgent and nearly universal. They can be easily described, so that they can be bought and
sold by persons at a distance from one another and at a distance also from the commodities. If necessary, sam-
ples can be taken of them which are truly representative; and they can even be ‘graded’ as is the actual practice
with regard to grain in America, buy independent authority” (MARSHALL, [1920] 1961, I, p. 326). Léon Walras’
general equilibrium of “well organized markets” is grounded on the same assumption: goods, wheat and barley,
are nothing but abstract “essence in the philosophical meaning of the term” (WALRAS, [1900] 1988, p. 44).
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