Entre Decisões Individuais e Deliberações Colegiadas: decidindo como decidir, influenciando o resultado

AutorJosé Mário Wanderley Gomes Neto - Flávia Danielle - Santiago Lima - Tassiana Moura de Oliveira
CargoUniversidade Católica de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil - Universidade de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil - Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil - State University of New York, Albany, New York, USA
Páginas10-31
Recebido em: 22/02/2019
Revisado em: 11/03/2019
Aprovado em: 18/03/2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2019v40n81p10
Direito autoral e licença de uso: Este artigo está licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons.Com essa licença você
pode compartilhar, adaptar, para qualquer fim, desde que atribua a autoria da obra, forneça um link para a licença, e
indicar se foram feitas alterações.
Between Individual Decisions and Collegiate Deliberations:
Deciding How To Decide, Influencing the Outcome
Entre Decisões Individuais e Deliberações Colegiadas: decidindo como
decidir, influenciando o resultado
José Mário Wanderley Gomes Neto1
Flávia Danielle Santiago Lima2
Tassiana Moura de Oliveira3 4
1Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil
2Universidade de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil
3Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, PE, Brasil
4State University of New York, Albany, New York, USA
Abstract: How does the institutional design
of the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) interfere
in the decision-making process of the conflicts
that are submitted to it? STF’s Justices, as
individually responsible of each proceeding
in progress, can strategically decide through
available procedural resources what and when
to bring them to trial individually or collectively.
This article inserts itself in this debate to question
the independence of its Justices before the other
political actors, but also before (or against) their
peers, considering the possibilities of interaction
of strategic models to the Brazilian case, before
the constituti onal, legal and regimental rules
that establish the performance of the members
of the Court. The general hypothesis is that the
normative design of the Court assures multiple
options for magistrates in the conduct of judicial
proceedings, promoting strategies aimed at
maximizing the winning chances of their
preferences, as well as reducing their respective
decision costs.
Keywords: Brazilian Supreme Court.
Judicialization of Politics. Judicial Behavior.
Strategic Model.
Resumo: Como o desenho institucional do Su-
premo Tribunal Federal Brasileiro interfere no
processo decisório dos conflitos que lhe são
submetidos a julgamento? Os Ministros do STF,
na qualidade de relatores dos processos em tra-
mitação, por meio de recursos procedimentais
disponíveis, podem decidir estrategicamente o
que e quando levar a julgamento, individual ou
coletivamente. O presente artigo insere-se nes-
te debate para questionar a independência dos
seus Ministros perante os demais atores políti-
cos, mas também diante (ou contra) seus pares,
cogitando-se as possibilidades de interação de
modelos estratégicos ao caso brasileiro, diante
das normas constitucionais, legais e regimentais
que fixam a atuação dos membros do Tribunal.
A hipótese geral é que o desenho normativo da
corte assegura múltiplas opções aos magistra-
dos na condução dos processos judiciais, pro-
movendo estratégias voltadas a maximizar as
chances vitoriosas de suas preferências, bem
como reduzir os respectivos custos decisórios.
Palavras-chaves: Supremo Tribunal Federal.
Judicialização da Política. Comportamento Ju-
dicial. Modelo Estratégico.
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 81, p. 10-31, abr. 2019 11
José Mário Wanderley Gomes Neto – Flávia Danielle Santiago Lima – Tassiana Moura de Oliveira
1 Judicialization of Politics in Brazil: a Super-Court, 11
Supreme Justices
Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) is considered a key element in the
Brazilian institutional arrangement, because of the remarkable universe of
subjects submitted to its appreciation and for its willingness to interfere
in relevant causes of national political life. Under the light of the Court’s
main role, since the enactment of the Federal Constitution of 1988, a
research agenda has been consolidated around the Court’s activity (and
omissions), with attention to institutional and behavioral factors that
explain its functioning, in interaction with others political actors, among
the procedures and decisions taken.
More recently, the internal dynamics established by the 11
Justices, in the exercise of the multiple powers of the “guardian of
the Constitution” draw attention, in an attempt to understand the
consequences of the institutional design of the Supreme Court for the
conduct of procedures. In this universe, the individual manifestations
of the members of the Court, possibly described as 11 decision-making
islands, would be a consequence of the procedural instruments that allow
the members, in a decentralized and individual way, to decide, signal and
set an agenda, from the granting of injunctions, in an arrangement known
as “ministocracy” (ARGUELHES; RIBEIRO, 2018). This immense
individual power of each judge is usually seen through individual
decisions, as pointed out by Falcão and Arguelhes (2017, p. 20-21), that
in 2016, decisions with the greatest political-institutional impact came
from individual acts, revealing strategic behavior in between the Justices,
as such a power demonstration.
The present work intends to move forward in the debate to
understand the increasing individual judicial action, from the description
of the possibilities of a Rapporteur Justice to define in the scope of the
STF the judicial body – Monocractic, Chamber or Plenary – to solve the
dispute, having in this change an interesting instrument to interfere in the
deliberation result.

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