The Politics of Takings Clauses
| Autor | Mila Versteeg |
| Cargo | University of Virginia, Virginia, Estados Unidos |
| Páginas | 43-94 |
The Politics of Takings Clauses1
A Política das Cláusulas Expropriatórias
Mila Versteeg
University of Virginia, Virginia – Estados Unidos
Abstract: A long-standing consensus exists
that the arbitrary or excessive expropriation of
private property by a country hurts its econo-
mic growth. Although constitutions can play
an important role in protecting private proper-
ty, remarkably little is known about how they
actually restrict the power of eminent domain
and whether such restrictions are associated
with reduced de facto expropriation risks.
The main finding of this essay is that no ob-
servable relationship exists between de jure
constitutional restrictions on the power of emi-
nent domain and de facto expropriation risks.
This finding suggests that the effectiveness of
takings clauses might depend on the politics
surrounding their adoption.
Keywords: Taking Clauses. Constitutional
Law. Expropriation.
Resumo: Há um consenso de longa data de
que a expropriação arbitrária ou excessiva de
propriedade privada por um país é prejudicial
em termos de crescimento econômico. Ainda
que constituições nacionais possam exercer um
papel importante na proteção da propriedade
privada, muito pouco se sabe sobre como, em
realidade, elas restringem o poder do domínio
eminente e se tais restrições estão associadas
com riscos reduzidos de expropriação de facto.
A principal conclusão deste trabalho é que não
se pode observar uma relação entre restrições
constitucionais de jure sobre o poder do do-
mínio eminente e os riscos da expropriação de
facto. Essa conclusão sugere que a efetividade
das cláusulas expropriatórias pode depender da
política que circunscreve a sua adoção.
Palavras- chave: Cláusula de Expropriação.
Direito Constitucional. Expropriação.
1 Este é uma republicação autorizada pela autora conforme a seguinte referência: The
Politics of Takings Clauses, 109, Northwestern University Law Review, 695 (2015).
Recebido em: 1º/09/2015
Revisado em: 13/10/2015
Aprovado em: 20/10/2015
Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2015v36n71p43
44 Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 71, p. 43-94, dez. 2015
The Politics of Takings Clauses
1 Introduction
A long-standing consensus exists that arbitrary or excessive ex-
propriation of private property by a country hurts its economic growth2.
When private property is not secure, international investors avoid making
long-term investments in the country3. Likewise, citizens underinvest in
2 One study shows that England, after the Glorious Revolution, improved long-term
economic performance by credibly committing to property rights. See Douglass C. North
& Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions
Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth- Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803
(1989). Since then, numerous cross-country studies have shown that a robust connection
exists between secure property rights and long-run economic performance. See, e.g.,
Philip Keefer, Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances: Political Credibility,
Citizen Information and Financial Sector Development (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 4145, 2007); Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, Polarization, Politics
and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth, 111 PUB. CHOICE 127
(2002). For an overview of the literature, see Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and
Economic Development, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205, 207 (2008). Related economic
literature has focused on the importance of “institutions” in ensuring economic growth
but also tends to emphasize the importance of property rights protections. See, e.g.,
Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in A
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 385 (Philippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf
eds., 2005); Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development:
An Empirical Investigation,5 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) [hereinafter Acemoglu et
al., Colonial Origins].
3 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 51–52 (1990) (noting that secure property rights increase
long-term investment because they reduce uncertainty and stabilize expectations);
Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global Transactions and the Consolidation
of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL CHALLENGES:
APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS FOR THE 1990S, at 195, 214 (Ernst-Otto
Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (observing that “[w]ithout secure property
rights market activities would be constrained because of uncertainty about the possessor’s
right to sell the commodity and the threat to achieve transfers through force and coercion
rather than voluntary exchange,” as a result of which “[c]apital allocation would be aimed
at maximizing short term gain—getting out before the rules of the game were changed”).
A body of literature demonstrates empirically that secure property rights encourage foreign
direct investment. See, e.g., Glen Biglaiser & Karl DeRouen Jr., Economic Reforms and
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(2006); Yi Feng, Political Freedom, Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study
Seqüência (Florianópolis), n. 71, p. 43-94, dez. 2015 45
Mila Versteeg
property because, considering the risk of expropriation, they discount its
future value4. Indeed, economists have long emphasized the importance
of secure private property rights as a crucial ingredient for economic
growth5. In fact, one recent empirical study suggests protecting private
property from government intervention is the single most important in-
stitutional predictor of economic growth6. Constitutional scholars have
often suggested that constitutions can play an important role in protect-
ing private property from arbitrary or excessive government expropria-
tion7. Constitutions contain various mechanisms that can restrict a gov-
ernment’s ability to deviate from the constitutions’ promises ex post. As
a result, constitutions allow governments to credibly commit to respect
private property and to signal to investors, capital markets, and individual
citizens alike that their property is secure from expropriation.
of Political Institutions and Private Investment in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD.
Q. 271 (2001); Nathan Jensen, Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct
Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040 (2008); Quan Li, Democracy, Autocracy, and Expropriation
of Foreign Direct Investment, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 1098 (2009); Quan Li & Adam
Resnick, Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment
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4 See Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory:
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WRDFFHSWWKHEDVLFLGHD WKDWµSURSHUW\ULJKWV¶WHQGWRLQÀXHQFHLQFHQWLYHVDQGEHKDYLRU´
(citation omitted)).
5 See supra note 1.
6 Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949,
953 (2005).
7 North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 805–08 (suggesting that credible constitutional
commitments to protect private property allow governments to access capital); see also
Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88–89 (2002) (suggesting
that constitutional commitments to respect private property can attract foreign direct
investors); John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2003) (describing constitutions as pre-commitment devices
and noting that “[a] government that is constitutionally barred from expropriating
property is thereby better able to attract capital”); David S. Law, Globalization and the
Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1309–10 (2008) (suggesting
that countries can use their bills of rights, and especially their property rights protections,
to compete for foreign investment).
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